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I INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the strict liability offence of the possession of 
objectionable publications in s 131 of the Films, Videos, and Publications 
Classification Act 1993 ("FVPCA"). The use of strict liability in relation to the 
possession offence was criticised during the passing of the FVPCA. This paper 
explores fully the criticisms that can be made about the use of strict liability generally 
and, specifically in the context of censorship legislation. 
Part II of this paper describes the offence and illustrates how it operates when 
someone is charged with the offence. Part ill looks briefly at the context in which the 
FVPCA was enacted by Parliament. Part IV begins by perusing the criticisms made 
during the passing of the FVPCA. These criticisms are explored more fully and 
developed by examining the relationship of the legislation with the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 ("Bill of Rights"). The general criticisms on the use of strict liability 
in the criminal law are canvassed. A comparison is made between how the provision 
operates in the FVPCA and how provision would operate in accordance with generally 
accepted criminal law principles, if the offence was not express strict liability. A 
comparison is also made with the operations of similar obscenity offences overseas and 
prior to the express strict liability provision in New Zealand. The paper then examines 
relationship of mistakes of fact and law to the offence. Lastly in this part, the 
inconsistent of the application of the FVPCA is explored by examining the decisions of 
the censorship bodies. The effect of this inconsistency on a person's ability to comply 
with the law considered. In Part V the paper concludes by drawing together all the 
criticisms made and suggests the reform of the possession offence in the FVPCA. 
II THE FVPCA SCHEME 
A The Offence Provisions 
The FVPCA contains several offences which enforce the censorship regime. 
The first group of offences cover the making and supply of objectionable and restricted 
LAW UBRARY . 
11CTOR1A UNl'/ER31TY OF \., t:L LIIK,, i 
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publications. Sections 124 and 127 require that a defendant have knowledge of or 
reasonable cause to believe a publication which she supplies is objectionable. 
1 Sections 
123 and 126 also cover the supply of objectionable publications but these offences are 
strict liability where it is no defence that the defendant had no knowledge or no 
reasonable cause to believe that the publication was objectionable.
2 The possession 
offence ins 131, however, is only phrased in terms of strict liability:3
 
s 131. Offence to possess objectionable publication--
( 1) Subject to subsections (4) and (5) of this section, every person commits an 
offence against this Act who, without lawful authority or excuse, has in that 
person's possession an objectionable publication. 
(2) Every person who commits an offence against subsection (1) of this section is 
liable to a fine not exceeding,--
(a) In the case of an individual, $2,000: 
(b) In the case of a body corporate, SS,000 
(3) It shall be no defence to a charge under subsection (1) of this section that the 
defendant had no knowledge or no reasonable cause to believe that the publication 
to which the charge relates was objectionable. 
The effect of s 131 (3) is that the Crown need prove only that a person is in 
possession of a publication. If that publication is determined by the censorship bodies 
to be objectionable then that person will be convicted. It is not necessary, that a 
person is convicted of an offence before a publication can be confiscated. There is an 
independent power to seize and destroy publications which are determined to be 
objectionable.4 
B tVhat is Objectionable? 
2 
Section 3 of the FVPCA defines when a publication is objectionable: 
s3. Meaning of "objectionable"-- (1) For the purposes of this Act, a 
publication is objectionable if it describes, depicts, expresses, or otherwise deals 
with matters such as sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence in such a manner that 
the availability of the publication is likely to be injurious to the public good. 
(2) A publication shall be deemed to be objectionable for the purposes of this Act if 
the publication promotes or supports, or tends to promote or support,--
Objectionable publications: s 124; restricted publications: s 127. 
Objectionable publications: s 123; restricted publications: s 126. These offences carry a 
lessor penalty than those involving knowledge. 
Subsections 4-8 omitted. 
Sections 107, 108 and 116. 
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(a) The exploitation of children, or young persons, or both, for sexual 
purposes; or 
(b) The use of violence or coercion to compel any person to participate in, 
or submit to, sexual conduct; or 
(c) Sexual conduct with or upon the body of a dead person; or 
(d) The use of urine or excrement in association with degrading or 
dehumanising conduct or sexual conduct; or 
(e) Bestiality; or 
(f) Acts of torture or the infliction of extreme violence or extreme cruelty. 
(3) In determining, for the purposes of this Act, whether or not any publication 
(other than a publication to which subsection (2) of this section applies) is 
objectionable or should be given a classification other than objectionable, particular 
weight shall be given to the extent and degree to which, and the manner in which, 
the publication--
(a) Describes, depicts, or otherwise deals with--
(i) Acts of torture, the infliction of serious physical harm, or acts 
of significant cruelty: 
(ii) Sexual violence or sexual coercion, or violence or coercion in 
association with sexual conduct: 
(iii) Other sexual or physical conduct of a degrading or 
dehumanising or demeaning nature: 
(iv) Sexual conduct with or by children, or young persons, or both: 
(v) Physical conduct in which sexual satisfaction is derived from 
inflicting or suffering cruelty or pain: 
(b) Exploits the nudity of children, or young persons, or both: 
(c) Degrades or dehumanises or demeans any person: 
(d) Promotes or encourages criminal acts or acts of terrorism: 
(e) Represents (whether directly or by implication) that members of any 
particular class of the public are inherently inferior to other members of the 
public by reason of any characteristic of members of that class, being a 
characteristic that is a prohibited ground of discrimination specified in 
section 21 (1) of the Human Rights Act 1993. 
(4) In determining, for the purposes of this Act, whether or not any publication 
(other than a publication to which subsection (2) of this section applies) is 
objectionable or should be given a classification other than objectionable, the 
following matters shall also be considered: 
(a) The dominant effect of the publication as a whole: 
(b) The impact of the medium in which the publication is presented: 
(c) The character of the publication, including any merit, value, or 
importance that the publication bas in relation to literary, artistic, social, 
cultural, educational, scientific, or other matters: 
(d) The persons, classes of persons, or age groups of the persons to whom 
the publication is intended or is likely to be made available: 
(e) The purpose for which the publication is intended to be used: 
(t) Any other relevant circumstances relating to the intended or likely use 
of the publication. 
Page 5 
The Film and Literature Board of Review ("the Board") recently examined how 
this section operates. 5 The Board considered that s 3(1) is a governing or umbrella 
definition of objectionable. A publication is objectionable if it deals with matters of 
sex, crime, horror, cruelty or violence in such a manner that the availability of the 
New Truth & 1V Extra (4 November 1994 issue) Board of Review Decision 3/96. 
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publication is likely to be injurious to the public good. The words "injurious to the 
public good" are retained from the previous censorship legislation,6 although the Board 
considered that a new interpretation of this phrase was required because "Parliament 
has signalled a departure from the old regime".7 
The Board noted the FVPCA "creates an entirely new method of discerning 
when the public good is likely to be injured. "8 The Act provides for a two-tiered 
system of determining whether a publication is objectionable. 
Publications which contain any of the characteristics listed in s 3(2) are deemed 
to be objectionable. That is, if any publication 'promotes or supports, or tends to 
promote or support' any of the activities in s 3(2) then Parliament has deemed that the 
availability of the publication is likely to be injurious to the public good and the censor 
is obliged to classify it as objectionable.9 
The censor is not permitted to consider whether availability of the publication 
would in fact be injurious to the public good, as subsection (2) carves out an automatic 
deemmg provision from the umbrella definition in subsection (1). The censor is also 
not permitted to consider the contextual criteria provided subsection (4), such as the 
dominant effect of the publication as a whole. 
If a publication does not fall within the absolute prohibition carved out by 
subsection (2), then the second tier criteria must be considered. Under the second tier 
a publication may be classified as unrestricted, objectionable, or objectionable except in 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Indecent Publications Act 1963, s2 (repealed); Films Act 1983, sl3 (repealed); Video 
Recordings Act 1987, s2 (repealed). 
New Truth above n 5, 7. 
New Truth above n 5, 7. 
New Truth above n 5, 8. The Law Commission considers lbat generally lbe word 'deems' 
creates a legal fiction . It makes something in Jaw lbat which it is not: The New Zealand Law 
Commission Legislation Manual: Structure and Style - Report 35 (Wellington 1996) 42. 
This is what is achieved by s 3(2), as lbe availability of publications which promote or 
support lbose activities are regarded as being injurious to lbe public good, wbelber or not 
lbey actually are. 
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certain circumstances. 10 In this way a publication may still be determined to be 
objectionable even if it survives the subsection (2) criteria. The Board noted this was 
the intention of the Minister of Women's Affairs' when she introduced the Bill to 
Parliarnent. 11 Subsections (3) and (4) simply provide the criteria for deciding whether 
the availability of a publication is likely to be injurious to the public good under the 
governing subsection. 
Subsection (3) requires that particular weight be given to the extent, degree, 
and manner in which a publication deals with certain violent and sexual acts, 
exploitation of young persons, degradation of people, promotion of criminal activity, 
and representation of classes of people as inferior. Subsection (4) provides for other 
factors that must also be considered, such as dominant effect and artistic merit. The 
subsection does not, however, require that 'particular weight' be given to these factors 
as compared to the factors in the subsection (3). 
These criteria provide the framework in which the censor determines whether 
the 'availability' of a publication is injurious to the public good. Although the phrase 
'likely to be injurious to the public good' is familiar from previous Acts, 'availability' is 
not. Even though the rewording is subtle, the focus has changed from whether the 
publication itself is injurious to the public good, to whether its availability is injurious 
to the public good. 12 
C The Process for Deciding Whether a Publication is Objectionable 
Where the character of a publication arises in a civil or criminal proceeding, the 
Office of Film and Literature Classification ("the Office") has sole jurisdiction to 
determine whether a publication is objectionable. 13 
10 
ll 
12 
13 
A publication that is objectionable except in certain circumstances is referred to as a 
restricted publication, and may, for example, be restricted to persons over a specified age, 
restricted person or class of person (such as the particular importer), or restricted to a 
specified purpose (such as a particular Film Festival or academic research); see s 23 FYPCA. 
If a publication is restricted it is not covered by the possession offence ins 131. 
New Truth above n 5, 6, citing Hon Jenny Shipley, MP 532 (1992) NZPD 12 760. 
New Truth above n 5, 9. 
Section 29(1). 
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In a proceeding where the publication in issue has already been classified, the 
subsisting decision of the Office is conclusive proof of whether a publication is 
objectionable.14 A person who is charged with an offence can apply under s 41(2)to 
have an earlier decision reconsidered if the decision was made more than a year 
earlier. 15 
In a criminal proceeding where the publication has not been classified, or the 
accused wishes to challenge an existing decision under s 41 (2), the Court must refer 
the matter to the Office for determination. All parties to the proceeding have the right 
to make a written submission to the Office in respect of the classification of that 
publication. 16 Also entitled to make written submissions are the Secretary for Internal 
Affairs, people with an interest in the publication such as owner, maker, distributor, or 
publisher, and any other people who satisfy the Chief Censor that they are likely to be 
affected by the publication. 17 Otherwise there is no general right to appear before, or to 
be heard by the Office. The Office may, however, consult persons that it considers may 
be able to assist it in its decision. 18 It is not necessary for the Office to hold a 
hearing. 19 
The Office will then examine the publication and classify it under s 23(2) as 
either unrestricted, objectionable, or objectionable except in certain circumstances. 
The Office reports its finding to the court,20 and must publish particulars of the 
decision in a monthly list of decisions.21 A decision takes effect 30 working days after 
the classification has been recorded in the list of decisions, unless an application for 
review has been made in that time.22 Any party to the related court proceeding may 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
2 1 
22 
Section 41 (1); tbis is subject to tbe resolution of any reviews or appeals allowed under ss 42, 
47, and 58. A copy of tbe register recording tbat decision and certification from tbe Office 
that tbe decision is still in force is sufficient proof of that decision: s 29(3) 
Reconsideration of a decision by persons other than someone charged is only permitted if tbe 
decision was made three years earlier, and the Chief Censor gives leave to do so: s 42. 
Section 20(2). 
Section 20(1) . 
Section 21. 
Section 22. 
Section 30. 
Section 40. 
Section 31. 
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apply to the Board for a review of the decision.23 The owner, maker, publisher, or 
authorised distributor of the publication also has a general right to seek review.
24 The 
Secretary of Internal Affairs may give leave to any other person to seek the review of 
the decision. 25 
The review by the Board is by way of re-examination of the publication 
without regard to the decision of the Office.26 The applicant for review, parties to the 
related proceeding, and any other person who satisfies the Board that they are likely to 
be affected have a right to make written submissions.
27 The Board has the same power 
to consult other people who may assist it in making its decision as the Office. The 
Board may also consult the Office, and is obliged to invite the Office to make a 
submission if other people have made written submissions or the Board has decided to 
consult any other person.28 The Board may hold a hearing, at which people entitled to 
make written submissions or people consulted by the Board have a right to be heard.
29 
The Board will then assign the publication one of the classifications available under s 
23(2). When the Board classifies a publication, the previous classification of the 
Office is deemed to be cancelled. 30 The decision of the Board may be appealed to 
High Court or Court of Appeal on questions of law only.
31 
The classification process only allows an accused a very limited right to be 
heard about a decision which has a significant effect on them. The accused may only 
make written submissions to the Office or the Board. An accused does not have the 
opportunity to make oral submissions unless the Board, on review, choses to hold a 
hearing. This is significantly less than if the issue was decided in court. Further, 
parties which otherwise would not have a right to participate in a criminal trial have the 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
3l 
Section 47(1)(c). 
Section 47(1)(d) 
Section 47(1)(e). 
Section 52(2); The Board, in Re D. P. Women Board of Review Decision 1/95, 2, noted that 
it classifies the publication as if it had never been classified: "fresh and unencumbered by any 
knowledge of the reasons for the Classification Office's decision". 
Section 53. 
Section 54. 
Section 53(3). 
Section 55(3). 
Sections 58 and 70. 
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right to make submissions to the censorship bodies, while the bodies may also choose 
to consult any person they wish. In this way, conviction may be influenced by people 
who have no direct link to the criminal proceeding or offence.32 
D Possible Safeguards 
There are two potential safeguards or checks that may have been intended to 
limit how s 131 is applied. 
First, a search warrant can only be obtained under the FVPCA in relation to ss 
123, 124, 127 or 129.33 These offences deal broadly with the supply of objectionable 
publications, exhibition to persons under 18 and public display of objectionable 
publications. There must be reasonable grounds for believing that there is an 
objectionable publication being kept with the purpose of being so dealt with, that there 
is any thing which is intended to be used for such a purpose, or that there is any thing 
which is evidence of such dealing. 
There is no general power to obtain a warrant for a search in relation to the 
possession offence. An Inspector or member of the Police cannot seize a publication 
without a warrant unless it is seized in the course of carrying out his or her lawful 
duties. 34 Restricting the method in which the offence can be discovered may restrict the 
scope of application of the offence and may also prevent the possession offence being 
used as a tool to target certain groups.35 
Even if this is accepted, there is still scope for the discovery of the offence in 
the lawful exercise of law enforcement duties. The possession offence can be 
discovered where a warrant is legitimately obtained for supply reasons or other 
32 
33 
34 
35 
See JF Kobyika The Politics of Obscenity: Group litigation in a time of legal change 
(Grenwood Press, Westport, 1991) for a discussion of how the participation of interest 
groups, both libertarian and proscriptionist, as amicus curiae appears to have affected the 
decisions of the US Supreme Court when deciding obscenity cases. 
Section 109. 
Section 108. 
See H Lapsley (1993) 197 Broadsheet, who suggests that there is the "potential for using the 
[FVPCA] legislation during more a repressive regime, to search for pornography in gay 
men's or lesbians' houses for example, as has happened in the past." 
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unrelated criminal offences, or where members of the Police happen on a publication 
while undertaking routine tasks. 
Regardless, a procedural restriction should not be seen to divert attention away 
from the potential injustice of a substantive provision. If the substantive provision is 
unjust, it is qualitatively no less unjust because it is applied against fewer people. 
The second safeguard that may have been intended to narrow the application of 
the offence is the provision of enhanced prosecutorial discretion. Leave of the 
Attorney-General is required under s144 for any prosecution under the Act. If the 
discretion is exercised sparingly, in cases of worst offending, and if the accused cannot 
be convicted of a supply offence, the possession offence could take a residual role. 
This may prevent the offence being instigated against less blameworthy people who 
possess, often innocently, publications which fall within the grey area of what is 
objectionable. 
This purported safeguard is a illusory. This power may be delegated to the 
Commissioner of Police in respect of offences concerning any particular class of 
publications.36 The Commissioner may then delegate this power to any member of the 
Police, of a rank not less than Inspector. 37 In effect, the provision can provide no more 
protection against arbitrariness than the ordinary prosecutorial discretion. The exercise 
of the prosecutorial discretion is already subject to much criticism and regarded as 
providing very little protection against injustice. 38 
Concerns about the exercise of the prosecutorial discretion were raised in 
Police v Quinlan39 in the context of censorship legislation. The defendant had been 
charged with the sale of indecent publications under s 21(1)(a) and (2) of the Indecent 
Publications Act 1963. The offence was express strict liability; the Police, however, 
36 
TI 
38 
39 
Section 144(2). 
Section 145(1). 
See for example, A Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law (Claredon Press, Oxford, 1991) eh 
2.2 
Unreported, 28 February 1994, District Court at Auckland, Judge CJ Rushton . 
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could have charged the defendant under s 22 which required that the defendant had 
knowledge of or reasonable grounds for believing that the publication was indecent. 
The classification of the publication as indecent was borderline and the Indecent 
Publication Tribunal noted its concern at the exercise of the prosecutorial discretion:40 
The Tribunal has considerable sympathy with the defendant's position. In this case 
where it would have been extremely difficult for a defendant to have known that 
these unclassified publications were indecent, it would have been more appropriate 
to have charged the defendant under s 22 ... [W]e are uneasy about how appropriate 
it is to proceed under [s 21] in these circumstances. 
III PARLIAMENT'S STRONG LINE ON PORNOGRAPHY 
The FVPCA was the product of a process of reform that began with the 
Ministerial Committee of Inquiry into Pornography.41 The Bill received support from 
the Government and Opposition members alike who heralded that Bill as taking a hard 
line on pornography:42 "The Bill sends a clear signal that the availability of 
pornographic material in this country is to be severely curtailed .... [The Bill removes] 
the serious anomaly in which possession of hard-core pornography was not an 
offence." The Opposition members, despite supporting the general thrust of the Bill, 
criticised the possession offence being made an offence of strict liability.43 The 
Government was adamant that, although the provision was tough, it was necessary to 
give effect to the principles behind the Act.44 
IV CRITIQUE OF THE POSSESSION OFFENCE 
A General Objections 
l Legislation Advisory Committee 
The Legislation Advisory Committee expressed concern about the imposition 
of criminal liability on a person without knowledge of or reasonable cause to believe 
40 
43 
44 
Re High Times (Edition May 1993 No 213) Indecent Publications Tribunal Decision IND 
6/94 2. 
Pornography: Report of the Ministerial Committee of Inquiry into Pornography 
(Wellington, 1989), commonly referred to as the Morris Report. 
John Carter, MP (1993) 536 NZPD 15 985. 
See for example Hon David Lange, MP (1993) 536 NZPD 15 989. 
Hon Graeme Lee, MP (1993) 536 NZPD 15 991. 
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that a publication is objectionable.45 The Committee questioned the purpose of the 
offence and queried how the offence would operate when blameless people were 
convicted:46 
[H]ow is a Court ... to determine a penalty appropriate to condemn behaviour which 
is blameless and to deter the recurrence of that blameless behaviour by the 
individual offender and others? 
The fairness of the strict liability offences was questioned, particularly in 
situations where there are swift changes in public opinion or where new kinds of 
publications receive consideration by the classification bodies.47 The Committee 
expressed unease that a person can be liable for possession of an unclassified 
publication where there is no certainty about the future determination of the Office.48 
The Committee suggested that it should be a defence "that the publication had 
not, at the relevant time, been considered by a classification agency, and that there 
were no grounds for believing that the classification agency would find the publication 
objectionable. "49 The Committee believed this would enhance respect for the law in 
this area as is would ensure that convictions would only be possible in conjunction with 
fault, and accord with the tenor of the concerns raised in the Attorney-General's report 
to Parliament. 50 
45 
46 
49 
50 
The Legislation Advisory Committee is not in general concerned with matters of policy, 
rather whether a Bill gives effect to policy and does so consistently with principle; see 
Foreword by Minister of Justice in Legislation Advisory Committee Legislative Change: 
Guidelines on Process and Content - Report No 6 (Wellington, 1991) 4 . 
Legislation Advisory Committee Submission on the Films, Videos, and Publications, 
Classification Bill to the Internal Affairs and Local Government Select Committee, 24 
February 1993, l; see also Legislation Advisory Committee Issue of Principle - Report No 8 
(Wellington, 1993) 35-40. 
Above n 46. 1 
Above n 46, 2 
Above n 46, 2 
Above n 46, 2 
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2 Indecent Publications Tribunal 
The Indecent Publications Tribunal also criticised the strict liability provision 
and suggested that such convictions could be extremely unfair. 51 The Tribunal said 
that "to specifically remove the requirement of a 'guilty mind' violates the most 
fundamental principle of the criminal law". It also thought the offence was unfair as it 
"will often depend on an exercise of discretion by the censors based on the vague and 
often subjective words of clause 3. "52 The Tribunal considered that it may be 
impossible to predict the exercise of this discretion, and any resulting conviction may 
therefore be perceived as a lottery. 
3 The New Zealand Law Society 
The New Zealand Law Society condemned the absence of any mental element 
in the offence.53 The Society was concerned that a possessor may be successfully 
prosecuted for possession of a publication even though they reasonably believed that 
the publication was not objectionable, they had checked the register to ensure the 
publication was not objectionable, and the publication had not been classified at the 
time of the offence. 54 
4 Department of Justice 
Even the Department of Justice considered that the offence was "unnecessarily 
harsh. "55 The Department considered that such a broad sweeping offence without 
safeguards had the potential for substantial injustice and was out of step with other 
areas of the law. It also expressed concern that in many situations prohibited 
publications are close to the margin and there can be no real certainty about the status 
51 
52 
53 
55 
Indecent Publications Tribunal, Submission on tbe Films, Videos, and Publications, 
Classification Bill to tbe Internal Affairs and Local Government Select Committee, 23 
February 1993, 26. 
Above n 51, 26. 
New Zealand Law Society, Submission on tbe Films, Videos, and Publications, Classification 
Bill to tbe Internal Affairs and Local Government Select Committee. 
Above n 51, 2 . 
Department of Justice, Submission on tbe Films, Videos, and Publications, Classification Bill 
to tbe Internal Affairs and Local Government Select Committee, 24 May 1993, 20. 
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of such publication.56 The Department suggested that the offence might not need to 
cover all publications if the primary goal is to prohibit child pornography or hard-core 
material. 
5 Academia 
The Bill was also sharply criticised by academics. Rishworth considered that 
the "policy underlying the strict liability possession offence made little sense - it 
criminalises conduct in the absence of knowledge of wrongdoing . "57 Brookfield 
labelled the provision as "draconian",58 while Dugdale strongly rejected the strict 
liability offence because it is virtually impossible to accurately forecast classifications.59 
B Bill of Rights 
The possession offence is inconsistent with a number of the rights and 
freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights. Although any inconsistent legislation must 
prevail under s 4, the Bill of Rights provides an appropriate background for discussing 
the injustice of the provision. The decision of Parliament to override these rights and 
freedoms was taken, in part, on the basis of a report by the Attorney-General to 
Parliament under s 7 of the Bill of Rights. The Attorney-General's report was based on 
a mistaken interpretation of the Bill and the protection against retroactive penalties in 
the Bill of Rights. The report was also inadequate in its consideration of the impact of 
the Bill on other rights. 60 
1 Retroactive Penalties - Attorney-General's Report to Parliament 
The Bill is one of only three government Bills the Attorney-General has 
reported to Parliament under s 7 of the Bill of Rights as being inconsistent with the 
rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights. 61 The report to Parliament focused 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
Above n 53, 22. 
G Husbcroft and P Risbwortb (eds) Rights and Freedoms (Brooker's, Wellington, 1995) 143. 
FM Brookfield "Constitutional Law" [1983] NZ Recent LR 278, 293. 
D Dugcla1e "Films Videos and Publications Classification Bill" [1993] NZLJ 16, 17. 
It appears that a failure to report or incorrect reporting does not create any judicially 
enforceable remedies; see Mangawaro Enterprises l.ld v Attorney-General [1994] 2 NZLR 
451 and Rights and Freedoms above n 57, 145-147. 
Rights and Freedoms above n 57, 141. 
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only on the strict liability offence of possession. The Attorney-General considered that 
the offence:62 
... has the effect of imposing criminal liability on a person, who, at the time which 
the charge relates, possessed the publication that was not then objectionable - by 
that, I mean objectionable in law - in respect of which it is no defence to prove that 
the defendant did not know or have reasonable cause to believe that it was 
objectionable. 
He then advised that the section was inconsistent with s 26(1) of the Bill of 
Rights which protects against retroactive penalties. This opinion was delivered on the 
mistaken premise that a publication only becomes objectionable when it has been ruled 
by the classification office to be objectionable; if there was no such ruling at the time to 
which the prosecution charge refers the offence operates retrospectively.63 
This point was clarified by the Legislation Advisory Committee in its report on 
the Bill. 64 It submitted that the section does not infringe the principle of 
retrospectivity, despite the determination of whether a publication is objectionable after 
the alleged offence. This is not saying that the publication was not objectionable at the 
time of possession:65 
The offence ... looks to the objectionable character of the publication at the time of 
possession. If there is no existing classification and the character of the publication 
is disputed then ... the body making the relevant decision makes it after the event. 
But that is a determination of guilt (or innocence) according to the law in force at 
the time of the facts constituting the alleged offence. 
The Legislation Advisory Committee report is consistent with the opinion of 
the Indecent Publications Tribunal in Re High Times66 where the Tribunal considered a 
submission that the previous legislation violated the Bill of Rights. The defendant had 
been charged with possession for sale of an indecent document and Judge Rushton 
referred the question of whether the book was indecent to the Tribunal which had 
exclusive jurisdiction to determine that question. 67 The Tribunal determined that 
62 
63 
6-l 
65 
66 
67 
532 (1992) NZPD 12 764. 
Above n 62, 12 764. 
Legislation Advisory Committee Issue of Principle Report No 8 above n 46. 
Legislation Advisory Committee Issue of Principle Report No 8 above n 46, 37 (emphasis in 
original) . 
Above n 40. 
Above n 39. 
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handbooks on how to grow marijuana were indecent. The Tribunal noted that 
although the determination of whether the ingredients of the offence were satisfied 
occurred before two different bodies, the offence was not retrospective and consistent 
with ordinary criminal procedure.68 
Reference to the wording of the FVPCA supports the opinions of the 
Committee and the Tribunal. Section 3 states that "a publication is objectionable" if it 
deals with matters of sex, horror, crime, etc, and its availability is likely to be injurious 
to the public good. The offence provisions refer simply to supply or possession of "an 
objectionable publication". There is no requirement that the publication must be 
classified before it becomes objectionable. 
Additionally, if the offence did operate retrospectively, the offence would 
violate section lOA of the Crimes Act 1961 which protects against retrospective 
criminal offences notwithstanding any other enactment. This provision is stronger than 
Bill of Rights and would probably require the FVPCA to expressly override it for the 
offence to operate. 69 
2 Freedom of expression 
The freedom of expression enshrined in the Bill of Rights includes the right to 
seek, receive and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form.70 The 
Indecent Publications Tribunal in Re "Penthouse (US)" (Vo! 19, No 5/1 considered 
that the freedom of expression does cover sexually explicit material. 72 The Tribunal 
relied on the decision of Re Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society and Ontario 
Board of Censors73 where the Ontario High Court held that "all forms of expression, 
68 
69 
70 
7 1 
72 
73 
Re High Times above n 40, 3. 
Compare with Bill of Rights which simply requires inconsistency under s 4 for the legislation 
to prevail. 
Bill of Rights, sl4. Similar protection is found in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, art 19(2). 
[1991) NZAR 289. 
Re "Penthouse (US)" above n 71, 318; It would seem to follow that publications which are 
not sexually explicit but 'objectionable' for others reasons would also be covered. 
(1983) 41 OR (2d) 583 . 
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whether they be oral, written, pictorial, sculpture, music, dance or film, are equally 
protected by the Charter. "74 
This protection, however, is not absolute; section 5 of the Bill of Rights 
permits justifiable limitations on the freedom of expression.75 Censorship of 
publications is permissible if the censorship is a reasonable limit demonstrably justified 
in a free and democratic society.76 This accords with the approach taken by the 
Canadian Supreme Court in R v Butler77 under the Canadian Charter on Rights and 
Freedoms. The Court considered that sexual and pornographic expression is protected 
by the freedom of expression, but reasonable limits on that freedom are permissible 
under the s 1 limitation section. 
The starting point then is that the censorship regime under the FVPCA prima 
facie violates the freedom of expression. The statutory regime, however, must prevail 
because of section 4 of the Bill of Rights. The critical question becomes whether the 
interpretation and application of the statutory discretion by the censorship bodies can 
be challenged. Section 6 of the Bill of Rights requires that where an enactment can be 
interpreted consistently with the rights and freedoms in the Bill of Rights, that meaning 
. is to be preferred. Section 5 permits reasonable limits on the protected right. Tipping 
J in Waverley considered that limits imposed by censors may be justified in a free and 
democratic society. 78 
7-4 
75 
76 
77 
78 
Re Ontario Film above n 73, 590; this view was affirmed by the Canadian Supreme Court in 
R v Keegstra (1990) 61 CCC (3d) 1; see also Re Information Retailers Association of 
Metropolitan Toronto Inc and Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto (1985) 52 OR (2d) 449, 
468: "Non-obscene "adult books and magazines", no matter how tasteless or tawdry they may 
be, are entitled to no less protection than other forms of expression; the constitutional 
guarantee extends not only to that which is pleasing, but also to that which to many may be 
aesthetically distasteful or morally offensive; it is indeed often true that 'one man's vulgarity 
is another's lyric' ." 
Compare with International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which expresses the limit 
directly in article 19(3) which includes "restrictions ... necessary .. for the protection of ... 
public health or morals." 
Bill of Rights, s 5. Most discussion on the interface between the Bill of Rights and 
censorship legislation focuses on whether a censorship decision is a reasonable limit: see, for 
example, WK Hastings "The New Zealand Bill of Rights and Censorship" [1990) NZLJ 384 
and Re "Penthouse (US)" above n 71. 
[1992) 1 SCR452. 
Society for the Promotion of Community Standards Inc v Waverley International (1988) l.Jd 
[1993) 2 NZLR 709, 727 (under Indecent Publications Act 1963). The Board accepts that 
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Decisions of the censorship bodies may be susceptible to challenge under the 
Bill of Rights. Where there is an ambiguity the FVPCA must be given an interpretation 
consistent with the freedom of expression, under s 6. If not, the interpretation and its 
application is reviewable. Where the application of the FVPCA limits the freedom of 
expression, but that limit is justifiable under s S, then its application is not reviewable. 
Where the statute is clear and no interpretation is consistent with the freedom of 
expression then the application of the FVPCA is not reviewable because of s 4 of the 
Bill of Rights. 
A challenge to a decision of the censorship bodies is most likely under s 3(3) 
where a censor exercises a very broad discretion. There is less scope for challenging 
decisions of the bodies in applying s 3(2) of the FVPCA, as this section deems certain 
things to be objectionable. The subsection is not discretionary and is an inconsistent 
limit imposed directly by Parliament through statute, which cannot be challenged 
because of s 4 of the Bill of Rights. 79 
Although a decision to ban a publication may be a justified limitation, the 
. inclusion of the possession offence may not. The imposition of criminal liability 
without any requirement that a person know the publication is objectionable will have a 
chilling effect on the freedom of expression. Rishworth noted that the Attorney-
General could have reported this inconsistency to Parliament: 80 
79 
80 
The Attorney-General could have reported that the strict liability offence was 
inconsistent with the guarantee of freedom of expression, in that it would result in 
self-censorship beyond that which was necessary to comply with the law, in order to 
avoid committing an offence based on a mistake as to the boundaries of 
'objectionable' publications. 
limits imposed by decisions of the Office and Board are prescribed by law: see Re D.P. 
Women above n 26. 
There is some scope for arguing that ambiguities exist in the meanings of the prohibited 
activities and whether a publication 'tends to promote or support' these activities and that, 
accordingly, a similar s 6 argument is still available. 
Rights and Freedoms above n 57, 167 footnote 55 . 
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Undoubtedly any rigid boundary that defines illegality creates a chilling effect 
because people are reluctant to publish or possess items in the grey area around this 
boundary. The FVPCA, however, exacerbates this chilling effect in two main ways. 
First, the position of the boundary is unclear because of the vague or nebulous 
definition of objectionable. It is extremely difficult to predict how the criteria will be 
applied in particular situations. Secondly, the absence of a no-fault defence means 
people will be compelled to dispose of any publication anywhere near the boundary 
because if they are charged with the possession offence they will not able to argue that 
they possessed the publication in good faith. Dugdale illustrates the point effectively:81 
So to avoid the risk of committing a criminal offence under this section a New 
Zealander must burn any book in his or her possession that might strike the 
Classification Office or the Film and Literature Boards of Review as objectionable. 
To hell with that. 
3 Presumption of Innocence 
The presumption of innocence is guaranteed bys 25(c) of the Bill of Rights. 82 
The doctrine is regarded as one of the central pillars of the criminal justice system, 
although it is essentially a product of the common law.83 The House of Lords in 
Woolmington v DPF84 said that it was the "one golden thread" of the criminal law.85 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v Rangi86 acknowledged that s 25(c) reflects 
· the "basic principle of criminal law [that] the onus of proof remains throughout on the 
Crown."87 
The presumption of innocence is, more precisely, a compendium of several 
legal principles. The Canadian Supreme Court in R v Oakes88 considered the nature of 
the right under the Canadian Charter.89 It decided the 'minimum content' of the right 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
rn 
88 
89 
Above n 59, 17. 
A similar provision is found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 
14(2). 
Robertson (ed) Adams on Criminal Law (Brooker's, Wellington, 1992) Chl0.16.01. 
[1935] AC 462. 
Woolmington, above n 84, 481. 
[1992] 1 NZLR 385. 
Above n 86, 389 . 
(1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200; 24 CCC (3d) 321. 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s l l(d). The section is identical to the New 
Zealand provision with regard to the presumption on innocence although the section in the 
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was that an individual must be proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt, the State must 
bear the burden of proof, and that criminal prosecutions must be carried out in 
accordance with lawful procedures and fairness. In addition, the Court in other cases 
has indicated the right requires that the elements necessary to constitute an offence in 
law ought to be sufficient to constitute moral guilt.90 
An offence of absolute liability or strict liability91 prima facie abridges the 
presumption of innocence because a person is convicted without proof of any fault 
element which, on general criminal law principles, would be required for a finding of 
guilt. The critical issue is whether this is a reasonable limit on the presumption of 
innocence. The Canadian Supreme Court in Reference re s 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle 
Act9
2 
said absolute liability could not be a reasonable limit except in exceptional 
conditions like natural disasters or war.93 In general it is difficult to see any limit 
imposed ,by absolute liability on the presumption of innocence can be reasonable when 
a reverse-onus offence is a less intrusive or more proportionate way of achieving the 
objective of easing the Crown's burden of proof.94 
The status of the reverse-onus offence under the Bill of Rights is less clear. The 
reverse-onus offence describes an offence with no express fault element which appears 
on its face to be absolute liability, but where the courts imply a defence of absence of 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
Canadian Charter also provides rights, such as a public hearing, that are protected under 
separate sections in the New Zealand Bill of Rights. 
R v Sault Ste Marie (1978) 85 DLR (3d) 161; R v Wholesale Travel Group Inc (1991) 84 
DLR (4th) 161. 
In this paper, strict liability is used to describe an offence which does not allow a defence of 
lack of fault. This is consistent with its use in the FVPCA. Absolute liability is the more 
familiar term for an offence with excludes proof of fault. Strict liability, however, is often 
used to describe offences, like those in Civil Aviation Department v McKenzie [1983] NZLR 
78 and Sault Ste Marie above n 90, where proof of the actus reus prima facie imports guilt 
unless the defendant can exonerate herself by proving an absence of fault. To avoid 
confusion, these offences are referred to as 'reverse-onus' offences, rather than strict liability. 
[1985] 2 SCR 486. 
Reference re s 94(2) above n 92, 518. 
Proportionality or the existence of a less intrusive alternative is critical to whether a decision 
is a justified limitation, Oakes above n 88; adopted by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in 
Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260. The Ontario Court of Appeal used a 
similar approach when they rejected absolute liability in favour of the reverse-onus offence in 
Metro News l.1d (1986) 29 CCC (3d) 35, although the issue arose in the context of 
fundamental justice under not the presumption of innocence. 
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fault into the offence. 95 Therefore on proof of the actus reus, guilt is presumed unless 
the defendant proves, on the balance of probabilities, an absence of fault 
In Wholesale Travel Group, 96 the Canadian Supreme Court was divided over 
whether a reverse-onus offence could be successfully challenged under the Charter. 
Two judges decided the reverse-onus offence did not prima facie breach the 
presumption of innocence,97 three judges decided that it prima facie breached the 
presumption of innocence but was a reasonable limit,98 while the remaining four judges 
concluded that it prima facie infringed the right and could not be saved under the 
limitation section.99 The ultimate result was that reverse-onus regulatory offences are 
permissible under the Charter. The same result appears likely under the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights. 
The possession offence in the FVPCA limits the presumption of innocence as it 
provides for guilt irrespective of the accused's state of mind. As noted in Adams on 
Criminal Law: 100 "Guilt is therefore possible despite 'moral' innocence." The 
no-defence provision cannot been seen to be a justifiable limit because a reverse-onus 
offence provides a more proportionate response to enforcement in this area, in that it 
adequately alleviates any difficulty in proof for the Crown, but still requires some 
element of moral culpability. 
C Criminal Law Criticisms of Strict or Absolute Liability 
Strict or absolute liability is criticised as a tool in criminal law on two grounds: 
it is unjust and it is ineffective. An appropriate starting point is Packer, who is one of 
the strongest critics of strict liability: 101 
95 
96 
'l7 
98 
99 
100 
101 
MacKenzie above n 91; Sault Ste Marie above n 90. Toe Court in MacKenzie drew a 
distinction between true crimes and public welfare regulatory offences; there is a 
presumption that silent offences which are truly criminal require the Crown to prove mens 
rea, while it is permissible with public welfare regulatory offences to require the defendant to 
bear the burden of proof. 
Above n 90. 
Cory and L'Heureux-Dube JJ. 
Iacobucci, Gonthier and Stevenson JJ. 
Lamer CJC, La Forest, Sopinka and McLachlin JJ. 
Adams above n 83, Cb 10.16.05. 
HL Packer "Mens Rea and the Supreme Court" (1962) Sup Ct Rev 107, 109. 
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To punish conduct without reference to the actor's state of mind is both inefficacious 
and unjust. It is inefficacious because conduct unaccompanied by awareness of the 
factors making it criminal does not mark the actor as one who needs to be subjected 
to punishment in order to deter him or others from behaving similarly in the future, 
nor does it single him out as a socially dangerous individual who needs to be 
incapacitated or reformed. It is unjust because the actor is subjected to the stigma of 
a criminal conviction without being morally blameworthy. 
The deterrence aspect of punishment will not be effective unless a person is 
aware of the factors which make the offending wrong. It is impossible to deter a 
person who is acting under a mistaken factual belief that their conduct complies with 
the law. A person is should not be marked as requiring incapacitation or reform 
because they are mistaken as to the facts of her offending. If they do, however, have 
full awareness of their offending then reform would be appropriate. Morally 
blameworthiness is taken to mean knowledge that what one is doing is wrong but 
choosing to continue that conduct. 102 
Some attempt to justify the use of strict liability on utilitarian terms, arguing 
that "the interests of the public require that the highest possible standards of care be 
exercised by people engaged in certain forms of conduct. "103 That is, it is necessary to 
occasionally convict someone who is not morally blameworthy to achieve that greater 
good as this greater good could not be achieved if defences such as lack of knowledge 
or reasonable mistake were allowed. The proposition that innocent people should be 
convicted is abhorrent and violates the fundamental presumption of innocence. 
Other commentators have suggested that strict liability offences are not unjust 
because they are not "real crimes". 104 Strict liability offences are often referred to as 
'public welfare' or 'regulatory' offences. The focus of these offences are not on 
punishing a wrongdoer, but instead regulating and controlling an activity. These labels 
102 
103 
104 
This paper does not wish to challenge the validity of the appropriate threshold of censorship 
generally. The analysis in this paper accepts that those publications which are objectionable 
under s 3 are correctly prohibited. Publications which are not, however, prohibited are seen 
as legal, legitimate, and are seen as morally acceptable. 
CMV Clarkson and HM Keating Criminal Law: Text and Materials (3 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 1994) 199. 
J Sayre "Public Welfare Offences" (1933) 33 Col L Rev 55 . 
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are designed to dilute any criminal stigma that attaches to the offences. Strict liability 
offences generally carry light penalties, such as moderate fines. 
These justifications lose sight of the overall perspective of punishment and rely 
on the validity of abstract boundaries within the criminal law. The change in label is 
merely semantic and may fail to remove effectively the stigma of a criminal conviction, 
especially with respect to offences involving pornography and indecency. La Forest J, 
when commenting on the suggested distinction between true crimes and regulatory 
offences, observed: 105 "What is ultimately important are not labels ... but the values at 
stake in the particular context." In addition, the accused or public are likely to 
perceive any fine or imprisonment as punishment, whether it is labelled as truly 
criminal or merely regulatory. As Lamer CIC said: 106 "[A person] has lost no less 
liberty because he or she is being punished for the commission of a regulatory offence 
as opposed to a criminal office. Jail is jail, whatever the reason for it." Brett considers 
that punishment of morally innocent people is reprehensible regardless of whether they 
are being punished for a regulatory offence. He suggests that those who argue 
absolute liability on that basis seem to be saying "it is all right to be unjust as long as 
you are not too unjust." 107 
The requirement of morally culpability has been rejected by others, however, 
who favour harm done as the trigger for punishment. Baroness Wootton moots an 
extension of absolute liability saying that the courts' primary function is the prevention 
of forbidden acts and "it is illogical to confine this prohibition to occasions on which 
they are done with malice aforethought." 108 She illustrates this with an example: 109 
105 
106 
107 
10 8 
109 
A man is equally dead and his relatives equally bereaved whether he is stabbed or 
run over by a drunken motorist or by an incompetent one. . .. [A]n action does not 
become innocuous merely because whoever performed it meant no harm. 
Wholesale Travel Group above n 90,198. 
Wholesale Travel Group above n 90, 204 
P Brett An Inquiry into Criminal Guilt (1963) 114. 
B Wootton, Crime and the Criminal Law: Reflections of a Magistrate and Social Scientist (2 
ed Stevens & Sons, London, 1981) 43 . 
Wootton, above n 108, 46. 
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This approach appears wholly out of place with the criminal law which has 
developed under libertarian notions of responsibility and individual liberty. The 
approach also risks diluting the deterrent aspect of criminal law because punishment 
for minor offences would be so common that it could become acceptable to offend. It 
also fails to account for crimes where wickedness or a guilty mind necessitates 
punishment despite no harm occurring, such as inchoate offences like attempts. 
The classic subjective approach of requiring mens rea and rejecting the use of 
absolute or strict liability is the dominant thinking in criminal law jurisprudence. One of 
the leading writers, Hart, strongly asserts the value of punishment rests on the 
fundamental tenet of subjective responsibility, that "unless a [person] has the capacity 
and a fair opportunity or chance to adjust his behaviour to the law its penalties should 
not be applied. "110 The no-defence provision in the FVPCA is directly in conflict with 
this. The strict liability possession offence may punish people who have no 
opportunity to comply with the law because they are not aware of the contents of a 
publication, or do not know that a publication is considered to be objectionable. 
D Inconsistency with Application of Similar Provisions in the 
Criminal Law 
The draconian nature of the strict liability clause can be illustrated by 
examining similar offences, both in New Zealand and overseas, where the courts have 
interpreted offences according to generally accepted criminal principles, fundamental 
justice, and the basic protections contained in bills of rights. The disparity between the 
approach adopted by the courts and the approach dictated by Parliament through the 
no-defence provision demonstrates the severity of such a provision and the degree to 
which it departs from accepted understandings of fairness in criminal law. 
l Possession of drugs - analogy to 'guilty knowledge' in drug offences 
The concept of possession of a restricted object has been thoroughly explored 
in the interpretation of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975. The Act makes it an offence 
11 0 I-ILA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968) 81. 
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have an illegal drug in ones possession. 111 The courts have adopted an integrated 
approach by interpreting possession as including some knowledge that the item 
possessed is prohibited, rather than simple knowledge of possession of an item. 
There are difficulties in analysing possession in the traditional terms of mens 
rea and actus reus because possession is a state of affairs and the physical and mental 
components are more intertwined than is typically the case with other offences. 112 
The physical component of possession is the requirement of control. The 
relationship between custody, control and possession is described in Adams: 113 
Custcxly is the narrower concept and is not a prerequisite for possession, whereas 
control is necessary for possession to exist. Custcxly does not involve a mental 
element, so that a person bas custcxly of something slipped into their bag without 
knowledge but who does not exercise control over it until the knows it is there. 
Whether this control then becomes possession depends on whether an intention to 
exercise possession arises. 
The mental elements are more difficult. The accused must have knowledge of 
the presence of the 'thing' which in fact is the drug.114 If a person forgets about the 
presence of the thing then they do not possess it. 115 The accused must have an 
intention to possess the thing, 116 and also a willingness to exercise that possession.
117 
The final mental requirement is the complex state of mind called 'guilty knowledge'.
118 
Mathias has deconstructed this composite into four key steps :11 9 
Ill 
112 
113 
114 
115 
ll6 
117 
118 
119 
(i) Awareness that a 'thing' exists; 
(ii) Knowledge that the thing is a drug, plant or seed; 
(iii) Knowledge of the characteristics of the drug, plant or seed, eg. its 
name or hallucinatory effects; 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, ss 6-7. 
Adams above n 83, MD7.06 
Adams above n 83, MD7.06(b) 
Police v Hart [1974] 2 NZLR 751. 
Martin v Police (1987) 3 CRNZ 33 . 
Dong Wai v Aduley [1937] NZLR 290. 
R v McIntyre Unreported, Court of Appeal, 9 March 1978, CA94/77 . 
Adams above n 83, MD7.06(a). 
D Mathias "Guilty Knowledge About Drugs" [1991] NZLJ 280. 
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(iv) Knowledge of the law: ignorance of law is no excuse under s 25 of the 
Crimes Act 1961 and guilt automatically follows on proof of step three. 
Thus the Crown is only required to prove up to step three, that is, that the 
accused had knowledge of the characteristics of the drug. 
Mathias uses Police v Taggart120 as an example of how the four-step test has 
been applied by the courts. The defendant was convicted of possession of prohibited 
aphrodisiac tablets which he knew as Miumbin. He did not know that the tablets were 
illegal because the drug was scheduled in the Misuse of Drugs Act under the unfamiliar 
name of Yohimbin. The defendant knew of the presence of the tablets. He knew that 
the tablets contained a drug, as he had obtained them from a chemist. He knew that 
the effects of the drug because several women to whom he administered the drug had 
to be hospitalised. His ignorance of the scheduled name was irrelevant and accordingly 
he was convicted as he had knowledge of the characteristics of the drug under step 
three. 
In R v Metuariki, 121 however, the defendant did not know that the magic 
mushrooms he possessed were drugs as opposed to innocent food material and he was 
acquitted at the second step. The defendant in Police v Emirali122 did not know that 
the household debris in his vacuum cleaner included cannabis and was acquitted at step 
two. In R v Strawbridge123 the defendant thought the cannabis plants were tomato 
plants and had no knowledge of the effects that the plants could have. She was 
acquitted at step three. 
120 
121 
122 
123 
(1973) l NZLR 732. 
(1986) 2 CRNZ 116. 
(1976) 1 NZLR 286. 
[1970] NZLR 909 . 
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This analysis can be applied to the FVPCA in the absence of the no-defence: 
(i) Awareness that a publication exists; 12~ 
(ii) Knowledge that the thing is a publication deals with matters of sex, 
horror, crime, cruelty, or violence; 
(iii) Knowledge of the characteristics of the publication which make it 
objectionable, eg. depicts necrophilia or dehumanises women; 
(iv) Ignorance that the publication is objectionable is no excuse and guilt 
automatically follows on proof of step three. 
Figures 1 and 2 depict graphically how the four step test insists on 
progressively more specific knowledge of the item possessed until it is narrowed down 
to the category of items which is prohibited. 
124 
Figure 1 - Possession of prohibited drug 
All thfogs 
Need awareness 
that 'thing' present 
Need knowledge 
that it is a drug, 
plant or seed 
Need knowledge 
of characteristics 
of drug 
Section 2 of the FVPCA has a very broad definition and includes any thing that has any 
word, statement, sign, or representation printed or impressed upon it. It is therefore 
analogous to a 'thing' in the possession of drugs example. 
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Figure 2 - Possession of objectionable publication 
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The no-defence provision operates, however, to require conviction at an earlier step in 
the process. There are, though, two possible interpretations of s 131(3) and its effect 
on the four step process. The effect of strict liability is usually regarded to remove any 
element of 'guilty knowledge' and will require only that the defendant knew that she 
possessed a thing. This approach would require conviction on proof of step one. 125 
The alternative interpretation of s 131(3) is that the provision excludes any proof of 
knowledge that the publication is objectionable in law, but still requires knowledge of 
the nature and characteristics of a publication. This approach would require conviction 
on proof of step three. This approach cannot have been intended by Parliament 
because such an application would not alter the previous process of proof. It would 
also mean that the Crown would be required to prove exactly the same steps of 
knowledge for supply offences which involve knowledge as with those which are strict 
liability. The only coherent interpretation is therefore that s 131(3) requires conviction 
on proof of step one where the Crown need to prove only that the defendant knew she 
possessed a publication. 
2 Mens rea should apply to all elements of the actus reus 
The notion of 'possession' at law has clearly developed to include knowledge of 
the characteristics of restricted object. The approach is consistent will the general 
125 For example see R v Lemon below n 164; Metro News below n 1-B. 
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theory if mens rea is required for an offence it should be applied to all elements of the 
--
actus reus. 126 
If the general approach is applied to possession of objectionable materials, then 
the actus reus of the offence can be separated into two limbs: the first is possession of 
a thing; the second is that the thing is an objectionable publication. The Crown must 
prove that the accused had mens rea toward the first limb of possession. 127 Secondly, 
the mens rea must also apply to fact that the publication is objectionable. The difficulty 
is that the second limb of the possession offence, that a publication is objectionable, 
operates closer to a question of law than a question of fact. 128 The no-defence 
provision in the FVPCA, however, does not require proof of the mens rea with respect 
to the second limb. 
E Inconsistency with Application of Other Obscenity Offences 
1 New Zealand under previous regimes - R v Ewart 
The defendant in R v Ewart129 had been charged under s 3 of the Offensive 
Publications Act 1892 for selling written matter which was indecent, immoral, or 
obscene. The Court of Appeal considered whether the offence required the Crown 
prove only that the defendant was selling a newspaper which was indecent, or whether 
the Crown also had to prove that the defendant knew or had reason to know the 
contents of the newspaper before he could be found guilty. The majority concluded 
that the commission of the act of selling prima facie imports the offence, but this could 
be rebutted by the defendant if he could prove the absence of a guilty mind. 130 
This case is regarded as the seminal case in New Zealand on the judicial 
classification of offences which are silent as to any mens rea requirement. The decision 
is the precursor to the reverse-onus category which has been widely accepted since 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
R v Howe [1982] NZLR 619; Police v Waaka [1987] NZLR 753 . 
Mens rea is generally regarded to include intention, knowledge, and reckless (knowingly 
taking an unreasonable risk) . 
See discussion below part IV F. 
(1905) 25 NZLR 709 . 
Ewart, above n 129, 737, Edwards, Williams and Chapman JJ; Stout CJ and Cooper J 
dissenting. 
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Sault Ste Marie and Mackenzie. 131 Ewart has also been frequently cited in overseas 
jurisdictions with approval in decisions which insisted on mens rea or some form of 
scienter in respect of the obscenity element of offences. 132 
In later decision of Fraser v Beckett and Sterling Ltd133 appears anomalous to 
the approach in Ewart. The Court of Appeal was required to consider the appropriate 
fault requirement ins 46 of the Customs Act 1913 which prohibited the importation of 
indecent document. The majority concluded that the offence was absolute liability and 
mens rea was not required to whether the document was indecent. 134 The majority 
indicated that there is a strong presumption is favour of mens rea. The courts are 
obliged to impose absolute liability, though, if it was the clear and plain intention of 
Parliament to impose absolute liability. The presumption of mens rea could not apply 
because several factors indicate Parliament's clear intention that the offence was 
absolute liability, including the fact that an identical offence expressly required 
knowledge, and conviction was required before the illegal goods could be confiscated. 
This case is distinguishable from Ewart because the presumption of mens rea could not 
operate because Parliament had plainly intended to impose absolute liability and its 
intention was almost as clear as if it has expressed it directly in the statute. 
2 Comparative analysis 
(a) Canada 
The Canadian Supreme Court in R v Jorgensen 135 recently considered the 
scope of the scienter requirement for sale of obscene materials. The defendant was 
charged with knowingly selling obscene materials after three video tapes depicting 
explicit consensual sex were purchased from his Adults-Only video store. 136 The video 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
See discussion of reverse-onus offences in text at n 95. 
For example: Smith v California 361 US 147 (1959); Metro News Ud above n 94; R v 
Wampfler (1987) 11 NSWLR 541. 'Scienter' refers to the degree of knowledge that the a 
publication is obscene or objectionable. 
[1963] NZLR 480 
Above n 133, North and McCarthy JJ, Gresson P dissenting. 
[1995] 4 SCR 55. 
Criminal Code RSC 1985 c C-46, s 163(2): "knowingly .. . sells exposes to public view or has 
in his possession for such a purpose any obscene ... thing whatever." 
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tapes were determined to be obscene at trial because they constituted undue .. 
exploitation of sex because of the combination of sex and violence. 137 
The Court held that the Crown must show not only that the accused was aware 
that the material had as it dominant characteristic the exploitation of sex, but also that 
the accused knew of the specific characteristics which make the material obscene in 
law. 138 Sopink:a J demonstrated the application of this rule: 139 
If, for example, the offensive part of the video was that which showed a male 
spanking the female and forcing her to have sexual relations, then .. . it must be 
shown that the retailer was aware or wilfully blind that the video being sold 
contained this scene. There may of course be cases where the obscenity results for 
the overall character of the film. This may occur where a video portrays women in 
positions of subordination, servile submission or humiliation without any 
verbalisation or other express reference to this depiction as a theme in itself. .. . In 
such instances, if the court is unable to specify any particular scene but still 
concludes that, overall, the film is obscene in law, then it only makes sense that 
sufficient proof be offered to show that the retailer was aware of the 'overall' 
obscene nature of the film. 
The Court did, however, note that this does not extend to proof the accused 
knew that the materials were obscene in law because ignorance of the law is no excuse. 
Thus if an accused viewed the videos and observed the spanking or noticed the 
underlying degradation but thought that it was harmless and inoffensive, then he would 
be guilty. 140 Sopink:a J also noted that knowledge did not have to be obtained by 
viewing the videos and that the blameworthy state of mind could be inferred without 
proving that the defendant actually viewed the videos, such as proof of surreptitious 
behaviour by the defendant, or warnings and directions from external enforcement 
agencies. 141 Equally, the Court considered that a person who is wilfully blind to the 
contents satisfied the knowledge requirement because a suspicion, which the person 
137 
138 
139 
140 
l4l 
Jorgensen above n 135, 105. The specific reasons for each determination were: Bung Ho 
Babes: "[equates] sex and punishment in the context of subordination"; Made in Hollywood: 
"coupled sex and violence"; and Dr Butts: "the woman is coerced into sexual relations and 
that the violence and her position of subordination are legitimized" . 
Jorgensen above n 135, 106. 
Jorgensen above n 135, 106. 
Jorgensen above n 135, 107 . 
Jorgensen above n 135, 108. 
An Objectionable Offence Page 33 
deliberately omits to turn into certain knowledge, requires some degree of initial . 
knowledge. 142 
The Supreme Court also approved the decision in R v Metro News Ltd143 that 
an absolute liability offence of distributing obscene matter was unconstitutional. 144 In 
Metro News Ltd the offence expressly provided that it was no defence that the accused 
was ignorant of the presence or nature of the thing that was obscene. The Court said 
that provision was a prima facie breach of the Charter as it infringed right to 
fundamental justice contained in s 7. It held that this infringement could not be 
justified under s 1 of the Charter because it impairs the right more than is necessary to 
achieve the objective of easing the Crown's difficulty in proving guilt, and accordingly 
struck the provision down as constitutionally invalid. 145 The Court recognised there 
was a substantial argument that such a provision also violates the freedom of 
expression contained in s 2(b) of the Charter, but did not find it necessary to decide 
whether the provision was constitutionally invalid on that basis. 146 
The offence then appeared silent as to the required fault element because the 
Court had stuck down the no-defence provision. The Court considered what 
category of fault should be implied into the offence. It rejected the idea that mens rea 
of the obscene matter was required and decided instead that the act of distribution 
prima facie imported the offence, but the accused could avoid criminal liability by 
showing that he acted under an honest and reasonable mistake of fact. 
147 
The 
possibility of mistake of fact was limited to the presence and character of the matter 
alleged to be obscene and not to the obscenity test of whether the matter exceeds 
community standards of tolerance. The Court considered that relieving the Crown of 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
Jorgensen above n 135, 110. 
Above n 94. 
Jorgensen above n 135, 95 . 
Metro News Lld above n 94, 53; The Court noted that the objective of the no-defence 
provision was "relieving the Crown of the burden of proof with respect to guilty knowledge 
on charges of distributing obscene matter because of the alleged difficulty or virtual 
impossibility in the circumstances of discharging that burden." 
Metro News Lld above n 94, 54. 
Metro News Lld above n 94, 63 . For true crimes the accused need only raise a reasonable 
doubt that in the absence of a guilty mind because of this mistake. 
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the burden of proving mens rea in this manner did not offend the right to fundamental 
.... 
justice and the presumption of innocence contained in ss 7 and 11 (d) of the Charter. 148 
(b) United States 
The United States Supreme Court in Smith v Califomia 1-49 held that a statute 
that imposed absolute liability for the possession of obscene books was 
unconstitutional. 150 The lower courts had convicted a bookstore owner of possession 
of a book that was later determined to be obscene. The offence included no element of 
scienter. The bookseller was liable even though he may have had no knowledge of the 
contents or character of the books. 
The Court was unanimous that the absence of a scienter element violated the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 151 The Court reasoned that, 
although obscene speech and writings are not constitutionally protected, 152 the 
absolute liability provision created a chilling effect that would limit non-obscene 
expression: 153 
The bookseller's limitation in the amount of reading material with which he could 
familiarise himself, and his timidity in the face of his absolute criminal liability, 
thus would tend to restrict the public's access to forms of the printed word which the 
State could not constitutionally suppress directly. The bookseller's self-censorship, 
compelled by the State, would be a censorship affecting the whole public .. . [1lhe 
distribution of all books, both obscene and not obscene, would be impeded. 
Accordingly the provision was struck down as being unconstitutional. It was 
not necessary for the Court to decide the appropriate level of scienter, although it 
noted that options included full mens rea, subjective or objective recklessness, and 
allowing a defence of honest mistake. 154 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
153 
154 
Metro News Ltd above n 94, 62. 
361 us 147 (1959). 
Municipal Code of the City of Los Angeles, §41.01.1; the appellant was charged with 
possession of an obscene or indecent writing or book in any place of business where books 
are sold or kept for sale. 
The accused could not argue that the offence violated the freedom of speech in the First 
Amendment because this applies only to laws made by Congress. The protection from state 
intrusion in the Fourteenth Amendment does, however, safeguard the freedom of expression 
where the inconsistent law is made by a state: Smith above n 149, 149. 
Roth v United States 354 US 476 (1957). 
Smith above n 149, 153. 
Smith above n 149, 154. 
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In the later case of Hamling v United States, 155 the Supreme Court considered 
it was constitutionally sufficient to require proof of knowledge of the contents of the 
materials and knowledge of the character and nature of the materials. 156 The Court 
was unwilling to insist on proof of a defendant's knowledge of the actual legal status of 
the materials as this would allow a defendant to avoid prosecution by "simply claiming 
that he had not brushed up on the law". 157 
Similarly in United States v X-Citement Video 158 the Supreme Court decided 
that with an offence of transportation of child pornography, the knowledge 
requirement "extends both to the sexually explicit nature of the material and to the age 
of the performers." 159 
( c) Australia 
In R v Wampfler160 the defendant was charged with publishing an indecent 
article. 161 The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held that an offence, which was silent 
as to any mens rea element, allowed a defence of honest and reasonable mistake in 
innocence. Street CJ considered that Ewart162 was directly applicable, because the 
New Zealand legislation was informed by the same policy considerations as the NSW 
legislation in the case.163 
(d) England 
The House of Lords took a different approach from other jurisdictions when it 
approved the imposition of strict liability in a criminal action for blasphemous libel. In 
R v Lemon, 164 Gay News had published a poem and drawings describing and depicting 
acts of sodomy and fellatio on a crucified body of Christ. The defendant had claimed 
155 
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158 
159 
160 
161 
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163 
164 
418 us 87 (1974). 
Hamling above n 155, 123 . 
Hamling above n 155, 123. 
(1994) 130 L Ed (2d) 372. 
Above n 158, 385 
Above n 132. 
Indecent Articles and Classified Publications Act 1975, s6(1). 
Above n 129. 
Wampjl.er above n 132, 548. 
[1979] AC 617. 
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that although he had knowingly published the poem and drawings, he had no mens rea .. 
as to its blasphemous nature. 
The majority held that it was sufficient the Crown prove that the accused 
intended to publish the magazine and that mens rea was not required with respect to 
whether the magazine was a blasphemous libel. 165 It has been suggested the majority 
implicitly applied the approach advocated by Baroness Wootton, that the justification 
for absolute liability is the existence of harm, regardless of the moral culpability of the 
accused. 166 
The minority strongly dissented despite their personal outrage at the 
material. 167 Their Lordships said the offence also required proof that the accused 
intended the blasphemous libel, that is, the accused intended to produce shock and 
arouse resentment among believing Christians. Lord Diplock said that classifying the 
offence as absolute liability was "a retrograde step which could not be justified by any 
considerations of public policy." 168 
The classification of this offence appeared difficult for the House of Lords. 
Even Lord Scarrnan accepted that the arguments of the minority had "great persuasive 
force". 169 This was the first time the House of Lords was required to classify an 
offence of this nature. Furthermore, their Lordships only had two discrete options, 
either mens rea was required towards the blasphemous libel element, or the offence 
was absolute liability; the intermediate reverse-onus category had not been accepted at 
that time. The majority opinion has been strongly criticised by commentators. 
170 The 
failure of the House of Lords to consider the intermediate reverse-onus offence and the 
fact that the result is at odds with all other jurisdictions means the English position is of 
limited persuasive value. 
165 
166 
167 
168 
169 
170 
Lord Russell, Lord Scarman and Viscount Dilborne. 
Clarkson and Keating above n 103, 104. 
Lord Diplock and Lord Edmund-Davies. 
R v Lemon above n 164, 638. 
R v Lemon above n 164, 664. 
See for example JC Smith "Case and Comment: R v Lemon and Another" [1979] Crim LR 
312 
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3 Summary - what do all these cases mean? 
The authorities from overseas and New Zealand prior to the express 
no-defence provision, emphasise an insistence on some proof of culpability towards 
whether an item is objectionable, indecent or obscene. Absolute liability in this context 
places an unjustifiable limit on rights protected by constitutional documents. England 
is alone in allowing absolute liability for obscene publications, although the decision 
was controversial. 
The courts have recognised the problems of proof for the Crown if mens rea 
requirement is required, but have overcome this by classifying silent offences as 
reverse-onus offences. That is, guilt is prima facie imported on possession but the 
defendant can exonerate herself by proving a mistake of fact or lack of a guilty mind. 
If mens rea is required, however, proof is required of mens rea towards the essential 
characteristic that makes a publication obscene. The courts are clear ,though, that they 
will not allow mistakes as to law. Defences such as mistake or no reasonable grounds 
for belief may only be applied to the contents of a publication, not to whether it is 
obscene or indecent. The corollary of this is that a successful defence under a reverse-
onus offence can be asserted not only where the defendant is mistaken to the general 
nature of a publication, but also where she is mistaken as to the specific characteristic 
which makes it objectionable. 
In the absence of s 131 (3) these authorities would allow at least a defence of 
mistake of fact or lack of reasonable grounds for belief. The characteristic of which 
the defendant could be mistaken could include any of the listed activities in s 3(2) that 
deem a publication objectionable under that subsection, or the factor or factors under s 
3(3) that operate to make a publication objectionable. A mistake as to the general test 
under s 3(1) of whether the availability of a publication is likely to be injurious to the 
public good would not excuse the defendant because this is a mistake of law. If 
alternatively mens rea is required then the Crown would need to prove that the 
defendant knew, was reckless or wilfully blind to all of those characteristics. 
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convincing:
172 the evidential problems are not more difficult than those faced with 
proving mens rea; the rule ignores the circumstances of and difficulties in achieving 
knowledge; a individual defence of ignorance of the law does not erode the principle of 
legality or that it is for the courts to determine what the law is; and blame for 
ignorance should not import blame and punishment for greater offences. 
The courts are beginning to depart slightly from the rule. Some jurisdictions 
have begun operating a general defence of reasonable mistake of law on similar terms 
to mistake of fact. 173 Other jurisdictions have allowed a defence of mistake of law 
where it is impossible for a person to know the law. The development of this 
exception has been rather ad hoe and confined to situations where the law has not been 
published or is otherwise not accessible. 174 
It is arguable by analogy that a where the law is so unclear that it is intelligible, 
a person should not be convicted under such a law, because it is impossible for her to 
comply with it. Fuller asserts that where a statute or the application of a statute lacks 
clarity it should not be enforced by the courts. 175 He regards clarity in the law as "one 
of the most essential ingredients of legality" .176 He argues that if there is a duty of 
citizens to obey the law, then there is a corresponding duty that the legislature make 
the law clear and understandable; if it is not, then the legislature has failed to make a 
law. 177 Vaughan CJ in Thomas v Sorrell 178 said that "a law which a man cannot obey, 
nor act according to it, is void and no law: and it is impossible to obey contradictions, 
or act according to them." 
The difficulty with asserting that mistake of law is no excuse in the FVPCA is 
that the law lacks clarity. Although the legislature has provided an extensive definition 
172 
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17-l 
175 
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177 
178 
See Stuart above n 171, 273-278 for an extensive critique of the rationale for the rule. 
South Africa: De Blom (1977) 3 SA 313; Germany: Penal Code of Federal Republic of 
Germany§ 17; see G Fletcher Rethinking the Criminal ww (Little & Brown, Boston, 1978) 
749. 
Re Michelin Tires Maufacturing (Canada) l.ld (1975) 15 NSR (2d) 150, R v Ross (1944) 84 
CCC 107, Burns v Nowell (1880) 5 QBD 444, Lim Chin Aik v R (1963] AC 160. 
LL Fuller The Morality of ww (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1964) 63 . 
LL Fuller above n 175, 63 . 
LL Fuller above n 175, 43 . 
(1673) Vaug 333. 
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of what is objectionable, the operation of the determination is unpredictable. 179 Even if .. 
a person is fully aware of the contents of a publication and of the statutory definition, 
their desire to comply with the law may be thwarted because of this lack of clarity. 
The accused may still be convicted despite making no mistake as to the law and taking 
all steps to comply with it. 
Glanville Williams regards questions, such as whether a publication is 
objectionable, as value-judgments which are intermediate between questions of fact 
and questions of law.
180 He recognises that on current law a defendant's failure to 
foresee the decision of the court or tribunal does not excuse her. Williams has no 
problem with this value-judgment when it concerns whether something is reasonable as 
the approach is accepted and predictable, but he says that serious problems arise with 
the nebulous nature of the obscenity question because the value-judgment becomes 
highly speculative. 181 The exercise of the value-judgment by the Office and Board 
confirm these concerns, as the overall pool of decisions show a disturbing lack of 
consistency and predicability. 
G Vagueness in Definition and Inconsistency in Application 
1 Meaning of 'tends to promote or support' is unclear 
The Board of Review in New Truth considered the phrase 'tends to promote or 
support' in the context of whether a newspaper tends to promote or support the 
contents of an advertisement promoting prohibited activities. 182 The Board mentioned 
synonyms such as 'encourage', 'support actively', 'publicise and sell', 'speak in favour 
of and 'be actively interested in'. A publication that publishes and sells a service 
contained in an advertisement clearly supports that service. The very nature of 
advertisements are to promote or sell those activities and, because the editor has the 
179 
180 
18 1 
182 
It is a travesty that the decisions of the Office and Board are not reported in widely available 
law reports and this failure exacerbates the difficulty of citizens knowing and predicting the 
censorship law. 
G Williams Textbook on Criminal 1.£Jw (2 ed Stevens & Sons, London, 1983) 141; These are 
sometimes referred to 'mixed fact and law' questions: E Colvin Principles of Criminal 1.£Jw (2 
ed, Carswell, Toronto, 1991)165; Thomas v R (1937) 59 CLR 279. 
G Williams, above n 180, 145. 
New Truth above n 5. 
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choice of whether to accept the advertisement or not, a publication containing those 
#-
advertisements also tends to promote or support those activities. 183 
Although a cogent analysis in the context of advertisements, it is also unclear 
how this phrase can be applied to other situations. For example the Classification 
Office decided that the Mapplethorpe collection did not tend to promote the use of 
urine in association with sexual conduct, or sadomasochism, despite graphic and 
positive depictions of such activity. The Office said that "it is the art of Mapplethorpe 
that is being supported, rather that the [prohibited activity]". 184 Stanish ponders 
whether "a book about a charming, erudite, and much loved politician who is also a 
necrophiliac" might be regarded as promoting or supporting necrophilia because it 
presents an unworthy character or activity in a favourable light. 185 Was the film 
Romper-Stomper promoting or supporting the brutal activities in the film by 
presenting the leader of the Nazi-worshipping street gang as a charismatic and 
engaging leader?186 Does Metro Magazine promote or support criminal activity by 
including heroine addiction in the month's list of what is 'hot'?
187 
The Indecent Publications Tribunal described the words as a "wild card" that 
could be used to ban publications such at Lolita, Last Exit to Brooklyn, Hitler's Mein 
Kampf, American Psycho, and Male Malifi.caruium, the handbook of the Spanish 
Inquisition, despite these publications having accepted merit. 188 The Tribunal also 
suggested that it could prohibit scholarly discussion of unpleasant topics, such Urban 
Aboriginals which was an account of the psychological and sociological explanations 
and effects of sadomasochistic practices. 189 The Department of Justice is correct in 
noting that a "publication does not have to expressly advocate" an activity in order to 
tend to promote or support it, but it is difficult to agree with its belief that "serious 
183 
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187 
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189 
New Truth above n 5, 15 . 
Jim & Tom, Sausalito, 1977 OFLC Ref 9501765. 
G Stanish "The Films Videos and Publications Classification Act 1993" (1994) AULR 719, 
722. 
Above n 185, 722 
Metro Magazine, Auckland, New Zealand, September 1996, 36; this question does not arise 
under s 3(2) because promoting criminal activity is not a prohibited activity, but is instead 
considered under s 3(3)(d). 
Above n 51, 11. 
Above n 51, 12. 
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work: of literature and drama, documentary material and professional publications" 
would necessarily stand outside that definition. 190 
The phrase 'promotes or supports, or tends to promote or support' still appears 
equivocal and brings a lack of clarity to the operation of the automatic deeming 
provisions. 
2 Inconsistent application by Office 
A survey of the decisions of the Office over the past two years shows a 
disturbing lack of consistency. This blurs the border-line between publications which 
are objectionable and those which are not, and exacerbates the injustice of the 
possession offence by making it almost impossible to predict a classification. 
The magazine Open Door 17, 191 which presented explicit images of women 
engaged in sexual activity with men, was determined to be objectionable under s 3(3) 
of the FVPCA. The publication degraded, dehumanised, and demeaned women by 
presenting graphic displays of women's vaginas, and images of women being 
penetrated and ejaculated over. Magazines of similar content and nature, however, 
have received different classifications. For example Expose, 192 was determined to be 
objectionable except if restricted to persons over 18,193 while Ribald No 404194 was 
determined to be objectionable unless its availability was restricted to the owner. The 
use of the restricted classification also makes the objectionable question ambiguous. 
Some of the decisions have classified publications as objectionable unless restricted to 
a particular event or person. Examples include movies restricted to a gay and lesbian 
film festival, 195 video documentary with frank depictions of sadomasochism but of a 
personal nature restricted to the importer, 196 a personal letter depicting cruel 
190 
191 
192 
193 
194 
195 
196 
Above n 55, 8. 
OH.,C Ref 9400983; See similar decisions: Sexasianal! No 2 OH.,R Ref 9400987, 
OH.,C Ref 9400982. 
The effect of this classification is to exclude the publication from the ambit of the possession 
offence; offences of supply and display of restricted publications are covered by ss 126, 127 
and 130. 
OFLC Ref 9400514. 
Hustler White, OH.,C Ref 9600476, Blood Sisters, OH.,C Ref 9600588, and Bittersweet, 
OH.,C Ref 9600591. 
From Wimps to Warriors, OH.,C Ref 21. 
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sadomasochistic images of women restricted to the owner, 197 and a magazine depicting 
~ 
explicit sexual material that degrades women restricted to the owner as part of a large 
personal collection.
198 
The difficulty caused by classifying similar publications 
differently is that decisions merely restricting publications may provide a person with a 
legitimate belief that such a publication is not objectionable. An example of this is 
where a person views a restricted movie at a film festival. The fact that a publication is 
restricted to an event or publication is not always obvious. From this a person can 
sensibly form the opinion that the movie is being shown with the approval of the 
censorship bodies and that similar such movies are not objectionable. If charged for 
possession of similar movies, however, that person cannot assert this rational 
justification for the possession. 
The classification of publications that deal with sexual violence or the infliction 
of pain has also blurred the border-line of what is objectionable. Many publications 
were determined to be objectionable because of the sadomasochistic nature of the 
publications or the use of violence in a sexual context. 199 Similar publications, 
however, received only a restricted classification: sadomasochistic activity is contrived 
and consent is clear,200 sadomasochistic paraphernalia only presented for effect,201 
high-depictions of infliction of serious physical harm upon a male's genitals 
acceptable,202 and depiction of vaginal fisting presented in a 'gentle manner'. 203 Again 
these classifications provide the public with little consistency with which to predict the 
potential classification of a publication. 
There is a particular problem with the interpretation of the clause relating to 
exploitation of children or young persons under s 3(2)(a). This provision is being 
applied very liberally to ban short stories that describe a woman seducing a 16 year old 
boy,204 stories that state that a male participant is 18 but is referred to as 'boy' and 
197 
198 
199 
200 
20 1 
202 
203 
204 
Letter "Dear Slave Sue" OFLC Ref 9500355. 
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See for example Bondage Landlord, OFLC Ref 874, Caged Fury, OFLC Ref: 9502174. 
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coer<;._ed into sex,205 video slicks that depict youthful-looking males,206 videos showing 
two teenage boys of slight physiques engaged in self and mutual masturbation,207 
publications depicting consensual heterosexual teenage sex,208 and publications of 
females portrayed as youthful because they have pig-tails .209 A CD-ROM that 
depicted young models, however, was not considered objectionable.210 It is also 
significant that the Board decided in New Truth that advertisements for sexual services 
that used phrases like 'school girl or boy', 'student' or 'students/virgins' tended to 
promote the exploitation of young persons regardless of whether an age is contained in 
the advertisement.211 Personal advertisements of 16 year old boys were also regarded 
as exploitative and objectionable.212 These determinations make it impossible to rely 
on the age of the model in predicting whether a publication is objectionable and 
demonstrate that the threshold for exploitation of young persons is more complex than 
the legislation indicates. 
The decision to prohibit advertising hoardings on Karangahape Rd which 
depicted cartoon paintings of women was controversial and unexpected.213 The signs 
were considered to be part of the social and cultural background of the area but the 
sign were banned because some people were offended by and concerned about the 
sign. Decisions like this illustrate the difficulty in predicting how the s 3 criteria will be 
applied by the censorship bodies. 
3 Disparity between decisions of the Office and Board 
Predicability is also reduced by the current disagreement over interpretation of 
s 3 between the Office and the Board. In the nine decisions that have been issued by 
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the Board a different classification has resulted on 7 occasions. The disagreement in 
approach appears to be over the operation of the s 3(2) automatic deeming 
provision,214 and the consideration of what activities are 'degrading, dehumanising, and 
demeaning'.215 
Given that the censorship bodies cannot reach agreement about what is 
objectionable, it is most unfair to expect the public to predict accurately the 
appropriate classification.216 Additionally, the censorship regime may effectively adopt 
a dual approach to classification because the Chief Censor considers that she is not 
bound by the decisions of the Board.217 
4 General problems 
The decisions of the censorship bodies do not appear wholly consistent. At 
least, the difference in classifications are a function of precise and exact distinctions. 
This approach may be appropriate where the question is whether a publication should 
be confiscated or prohibited from the country, but is not appropriate where criminal 
sanctions are imposed. Under the old regime a person was convicted for selling a 
handbook on how to grow marijuana which was unconditionally indecent because it 
promoted criminal activity, yet a similar publication advocating law reform and social 
advocacy of a certain marijuana lifestyle was classified as restricted.218 It was 
practically impossible for the defendant to predict the distinguishing features of the 
publications, or their consequences. 
21-l 
215 
216 
217 
218 
See New Truth above n 5. 
See for example Australian Penthouse Hot Shots No I Board of Review Decision 2/95. 
A person can be convicted of an offence even where she relies on the decision of one body 
only to have the opposite view taken by the other body. Even in the absence of s 131(3), it is 
unclear whether the doctrine of officially induced error is available in New Zealand in such a 
situation: see Adams above n 83, CA25.08, N Cameron Defences and the Crimes Bill (1990) 
20 VUWLR Mono 3 66; See Jorgensen above n 135 for a discussion of whether the defence 
might be available in the obscenity cases. 
Paterson, Morning Report interview, Radio NZ, 23 February 1996. 
Quinlan above n 39. 
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Despite an extensive attempt to clarify what is objectionable, Parliament has 
not removed the ambiguity from the definition of what is objectionable. The 
impreciseness of the definition is noted in Adams on Criminal Law:219 
The critical phrase 'injurious to the public good' is open textured and will require 
interpretation and application to particular cases. Expression in films, videos, and 
publications will fall in a continuum as regards its potential impact on the public 
good. The point at which it becomes 'injurious' will not be marked by any bright 
line. 
It may be suggested that this ambiguity is simple because a new regime has 
been instigated and that this uncertainty will diminish as a pool of decisions and rules 
are accumulated. This may be so of the interpretation of other legislation, but the 
interpretation of censorship legislation is peculiarly variable. Kobylk:a notes that the 
decision about whether a publication is objectionable is as much a function of the 
membership of court or tribunal, people making application or submissions, parties 
joined to a proceeding as amicus curae, and public opinion, as it is with the content of 
the publication.220 Under previous regimes, New Zealand has seen a high degree a 
variability in decisions, caused by extrinsic factors, for example, the homosexual law 
reform which necessitated a different approach to interpretation of the censorship 
legislation. 221 
The strict liability offence operates so that a person cannot argue that they did 
not know that a publication had certain characteristics that make it objectionable. 
Thus many thousand of people who possess the November 4th edition of the New 
Truth & TV Extra may be successfully prosecuted. A person may be convicted if they 
receive file on over the internet which later is classified as objectionable despite the fact 
the file may have been unsolicited or remained zipped on the hard drive. 
Equally, if a person is aware of the very characteristics of a publication and 
seeks legal advice about whether it is illegal or not, they will have no defence to a 
219 
220 
221 
Adams above n 83, Ch 10.6.08. 
Kobylka above n 32. 
Society for the Promotion of Community Standards v Evrard ( 1988) 7 NZAR 33. 
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charge. The legal advice may be extremely cogent and may rely on strong precedents 
#-
from the censorship bodies. 
The objections to the possession offence may be equally applicable to supply 
offences which are strict liability. It is arguable, however, that this is less of a concern 
because supplying publications places a greater duty on the person to ascertain whether 
their conduct is legal. Suppliers will be expected to have a greater knowledge of the 
rules governing their industry; they may be able to liaise with enforcement authorities, 
seek legal advice, or submit publications to the censorship bodies if they are unsure 
about their classification.222 These options are not usually available to a person who 
simply possesses a publication. 
The supply offences are not, though, confined to persons in the trade. It is 
possible, and increasingly common because of current technology, for an individual to 
casually supply publications. Such a person could blamelessly supply publications only 
to be later convicted under a strict liability offence. 
V CONCLUSION AND CALL FOR REFORM 
This paper has explored the criticisms of strict liability in the context of 
censorship legislation and found them justified. Section 131 is inconsistent with the 
Bill of Rights and Parliament's choice to override the Bill of Rights was based, in part, 
on incorrect and inadequate advice from the Attorney-General in his report to 
Parliament. The strict liability offence appears out of line with the widely accepted 
criminal law jurisprudence which requires a subjective approach to guilt. Section 131 
also operates inconsistently with how the offence would be applied, in the absence of 
the no-defence provision, according to accepted principles of criminal law and fairness. 
This is further illustrated by the comparison with similar obscenity offences in overseas 
jurisdictions, where the use of strict liability has been rejected. This lack of clarity in 
censorship law makes a compelling argument that the rule that ignorance of the law is 
no excuse should not apply as rigidly in this area. The lack of predicability of decisions 
under the FVPCA makes the imposition of criminal sanctions, in the absence of some 
222 Department of Justice above n 55, 21. 
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scienter requirement, for the possession of an objectionable publication wholly unfair . .. 
It follows that the FVPCA should be amended to remove the no-defence provision and 
replace it with an appropriate scienter element 
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also identified the FVPCA 
as a principal area of concem.223 The Committee routinely reports on New Zealand's 
implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.224 In 
considering New Zealand's Third Report to the committee, it commented that: 225 
In relation to tbe right of freedom of expression, tbe Committee expresses its 
concern over tbe vagueness of tbe term 'objectionable publication' and tbe fact tbat 
Section 121 of tbe Films, Videos and Publications Classification Act makes tbe 
'possession of any objectionable publication' a criminal offence, even if tbe person 
concerned bas no knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that tbe publication is 
considered as objectionable. 
The Committee recommended that the amendment of the FVPCA by including 
a more specific definition of 'objectionable publication' and by removing criminal 
liability for possession without knowledge of or reasonable cause to believe in the 
objectionality of the material.226 
The Board in New Truth acknowledged the report and the criticisms that can 
be made about the censorship regime. It noted, however, that they are obliged to apply 
the FVPCA as it is clear that Parliament intended that it be applied in that manner, 
despite the fact that the law cannot be justified in a free and democratic society.
227 
The most appropriate reform of the legislation would be the replacement of the 
no-defence provision with a defence that, at the time of possession, the defendant had 
22] 
214 
22 5 
226 
227 
The 1393rd to 1395th meetings of tbe Committee (CCPR/C/SR.1393 to SR.1395) 
considering New Zealand's third periodic report (CCPR/C/64/ Add.10 and 
HRI/CORE/l/Add.33); Comments published in New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade Human Rights in New Zealand (Information Bulletin No 54, June 1995). 
The protection in tbe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is similar to tbe 
protection in tbe Bill of Rights. 
Above n 223, 69. 
Above n 223, 70 . 
New Truth above n 5, 18. 
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no ~owledge or reasonable cause to belive that the publication was objectionable.228 
This would mean the defendant could exonerate herself by proving that she lacked 
knowledge of the nature or presence of an objectionable publication. This accords 
with the approach taken in overseas jurisdictions. 
She could also prove that she had no reasonable grounds for believing that the 
publication would be determined to be objectionable if the publication had not been 
classified by the censorship bodies at the time of the possession. This allows a slight 
erosion to the ignorance of the law is no excuse rule as the accused can successfully 
assert that she could not comply with the law because she could not predict the 
determination of the censorship bodies. 
This lack of reasonable belief would appear to operate on two levels. First, 
proof that the accused was aware of the characteristics of a publication under s 3(2) 
would automatically give the accused reasonable grounds for believing that the 
publication is objectionable and thus no defence is available. Conviction would not be 
too difficult and this accords with the apparent intention of Parliament to crack down 
on hard-core pornography and violence. Secondly, proof of knowledge of the 
characteristics under s 3(3) would not be enough in itself to obtain a conviction; the 
accused could also argue that the decision of the censorship body was unpredictable. 
If, however, the publication or publications with very similar content had been 
determined to be objectionable, she would not be able to assert the defence. An 
accused may also assert some other basis for reasonably believing that the publication 
was not objectionable. This deals with the concerns at the imposition of criminal 
sanction in the grey area of what is objectionable. Basically there must be a very 
strong likelihood of classification under s 3(3) at the time of the possession before an 
accused is found guilty. This allows people who deliberately flout the law to be 
convicted, but does not convict morally blameless people who, through no fault of 
their own, are not aware that the publications they possess are objectionable. 
228 This was similar to the alternative favoured by the Department of Justice in its submission on 
tbe Bill, see above n 55, 22. 
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In summary, the replacement of the no-defence provision with a defence of no 
knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that a publication is objectionable will 
enhance the law by incorporating basic principles of fairness into the FVPCA, but will 
still allow for the effective enforcement of the censorship regime. 
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